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In this article, we argue that firms that are floated on the stock market are subject to
close scrutiny by financial markets, which hinder them from implementing the type of
empire-building overinvestment policies that may generate inventory accumulation
(the signaling role of inventories). Also, listed firms have more resource availability to
finance their investment projects and do not need to use inventories as a tool for dealing
with their liquidity requirements (the liquidity role). Taking into account both these
roles—signaling and liquidity—our main hypothesis is that after a firm is listed on the
stock market, there is a decline in its inventory level as well as in its inventory
variability, especially in those firms with larger liquidity needs (i.e., small firms and/or
firms with financial difficulties). We further argue that the reductions in inventories will
be larger for equity issues than for debt issues.
Using a sample of US manufacturing firms for the period 1994–2004, we find
evidence that conforms to our theoretical predictions, suggesting a natural stabilizing
mechanism that may smooth the economic cycle.
& 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.b
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M1. Introduction
There are different reasons that justify inventory
investments. Focusing on the demand side, firms accu-
mulate inventories as a buffer mechanism for attending
unexpected demand and avoid stock outs. Under a supply-
side perspective, inventories have different roles: They are
indicators of operational mismanagement (Krautter,
1999), of future growth expectations (Lai, 2006), or
credible signals that the firm is willing to compete fiercely
in the future because it has enough slack to sell goods
at a lower future price—signaling role—(Rotemberg and
Saloner, 1989). But also, inventories allow companies
to obtain liquidity in the short term—liquidity role—
(Guariglia, 2000). For example, firms can obtain funds in
case of a liquidity shock like an increase in lending ratest
s
t
p
All rights reserved.
niversidad Carlos III,y selling inventories at a price that is slightly lower than
arket value, for elastic-demand goods. In this way,
nventories may be used as a substitute mechanism for
nancial instruments.
In this paper, we advance in this direction and we
tudy the effect that firms’ initial public offerings (IPOs)
ave on their inventory policies. To the best of our
nowledge, this is an unexplored topic. The literature
as mainly focused on the effect of an IPO in the overall
rm’s investment, ignoring the specificities of inventories.
e believe that this is a relevant question to study, given
he increased number of firms that float on the stock
arket, especially during expansive periods (Ritter and
elch, 2002). This, in turn, may affect inventory invest-
ent and, in the end, the overall economic cycle.
emarkably, inventories are responsible for up to 87% of
he total peak-to-trough movement in GNP (Blinder and
accini, 1991). The main conclusion of this paper is that
here is a reduction in the inventory level after an IPO,
uggesting a stabilizing mechanism that may smooth
he overall economic cycle, since IPOs are pro-cyclical
henomena.
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n EconDifferent effects are at work when financing issues and
inventory investments are associated. First, inventories
have a clear signaling role (Lai, 2006). According to
different authors (Krautter, 1999; Lai, 2006), inventory
accumulation is a signal of mismanagement. This means
that those firms that are weakly monitored tend to
accumulate more inventories. Tribo´ (2007) showed that
the presence of specialists in monitoring, such as banks,
reduces inventory levels as well as inventory variability.
Under this view, a discount price should be observed in
those firms that accumulate a large amount of inventories
(Lai, 2006). Notably, financial markets are a powerful
controlling mechanism and, thus, may preclude listed
firms from accumulating a disproportionate amount of
inventories and change them abruptly.
Second, after an IPO, there is a reduction in the cost of
capital, which facilitates inventory investment (Lai, 2005).
However, in the opposite direction, listed firms are less
liquidity constrained and eventual liquidity shocks have
lower effects on inventories (Guariglia, 2000), given that
firms may use financial instruments to smooth these
shocks. In this line, Kashyap et al. (1994) showed that
liquidity measures are significant in explaining the
inventory variation of firms that have difficulties in
issuing bonds (without bond rating) but liquidity is not
significant for explaining inventory variation for those
firms that can issue bonds easily (with bond rating).
Finally, another strand of the literature connects
inventories with overinvestment practices that are im-
plemented when a firm has a specific ownership struc-
ture. Gomes and Novaes (2005) showed that in more
diluted ownership structures (i.e., when there is a large
amount of blockholders), overinvestment is less likely.
This is so because the higher the number of shareholders,
the more likely to have conflicting views on the type of
investments to undertake. This prevents overinvestment
actions like those that lead to intensive inventory
accumulation. According to this view, ownership dilution,
which is a common feature after an IPO, should hinder
inventory accumulation.
Considering the foregoing arguments, we expect that,
after an IPO, a firm should lower its inventory levels. This
is the main claim of the paper and is consistent with the
findings of Chen et al. (2005): a 2% inventory reduction
per year in the US between 1981 and 2000. Higher
number of firms listed on the stock market during this
period,2 jointly with the improvements in operational
technology explaining the great moderation phenomenon
in the US (Blanchard and Simon, 2000), will generate
reductions in inventory level.
We address three extensions in this paper. First, we
distinguish between final-good and raw-material inven-
tories and hypothesize that inventory reduction in
recently listed firms should be more pronounced for
raw-material inventories. We argue that these are liquid-
type inventories (less specific) and it is easier to sell them
2
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. ProductioA measure of this trend is that the share of the IPOs as percentage
of the overall market value has increased from less than 3% in 1990 to a
peak of 13% in 2000 (Rousseau, 2006).in the factor market. Hence, after an IPO, these more liquid
inventories that a firm had relied on to raise liquidity
will be the first ones to be substituted by financial
instruments as liquidity-provider mechanisms. Second,
we analyze different companies’ characteristics and
expect that firms with large liquidity needs or poorly
monitored (i.e., small firms and/or with liquidity con-
straints) will benefit more from being listed on the stock
market and their inventory reduction should be more
pronounced. Last, looking beyond a firm’s flotation, we
study the effect of subsequent share issues by listed firms
on inventory policy. We expect successive reductions in
inventory levels, but on a smaller scale compared with the
corresponding after the IPO. This logic also applies to debt
issues, where we expect even lower effects. We test these
theoretical contentions using a panel data sample of US
manufacturing firms obtained from COMPUSTAT database
for the period 1994–2004. Our results fully confirm our
theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 develops the theoretical underpinnings and
presents the hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3, the
empirical analysis is carried out. The paper concludes with
some final remarks.
omics 118 (2009) 10–18 112. Hypotheses to contrast
We rely on the supply-side role of inventories as
indicators, and marginally as liquidity providers for
elastic-demand goods3 to build up our theoretical frame-
work, which connects changes in ownership structure
with inventory policy.
Concerning the signaling role of inventories, different
issues should be taken into account. First, inventories may
signal an operational mismanagement (Krautter, 1999;
Lai, 2006). Second, they may be connected to good firm’s
futures sales perspectives (Lai, 2006). Last, firms may
want to obtain a high issuing price by signaling them-
selves as a strong competitor. A way to achieve this is, for
example, by accumulating a large amount of inventories
in the period previous to the IPO. Hendel (1996) argued
the importance of having inventories to compete in prices
during downturns as a way to prevent a firm’s financial
distress. These three arguments suggest that, after the IPO,
operational managers are likely to face pressures from
financial markets to reduce inventory levels. First, there is
an increase in the management control due to the close
scrutiny from the investors that trade shares in financial
markets, discouraging inventory overinvestment. Second,
once a firm is listed on the stock market, market prices are
the ‘‘natural’’ signaling mechanisms for future sales
perspectives that wrap up all relevant information like
that of inventory accumulation. Last, if a firm had
overinvested in the period previous to an IPO as a way
to signal itself as a strong competitor, it would have to3 If demand is quite elastic, with a slight reduction in prices it is
possible to increase substantial liquidity by selling inventories.
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contention. As mentioned before, Guariglia (2000) proves that debt-to-
inventory ratio is relevant to explain inventory policy in financially
constrained firms. If a firm’s short-term liabilities are important, then a
Econocredibly commit to this signal and sell products aggres-
sively by disinvesting inventories.4 Then, according to
these three foregoing arguments, a reduction in the
inventory level is expected.
A second argument that justifies the reductions in
inventory levels, together with their variability after an
IPO, is connected to the increase in the number and the
greater heterogeneity of shareholders once a firm is listed
on the stock market. This makes agreements among
shareholders over the investments to undertake more
difficult to achieve (Gomes and Novaes, 2005). Hetero-
geneous shareholders’ interests, when they are mutually
exclusive, prevent overinvestment which, in turn, will lead
to inventory reductions after an IPO. Additionally, this
kind of mutual blockage over investment decisions also
hinders significant variation in a firm’s investment
strategy. This will reduce inventory variability.
Finally, when we turn our attention to the possible
liquidity role of inventories, we argue that for elastic-
demand products that are not very specific (chemicals
sector), inventories may act as a buffer mechanism for
providing liquidity. For low-differentiation products, a firm
can raise liquidity substantially by reducing slightly the
price of the good sold which, in turn, will damage its
competitors’ customer base. This liquidity role of inventories
is the basis of the Guariglia (2000) model, assuming that the
cost of capital could be an increasing function of the short-
term debt to inventory ratio. That is, inventories are
considered as easily-converted liquidity assets that reduce
financing pressure and can be used to deal with financial
obligations. Using such a model, the author derives an
equation of inventories in terms of the previous period
short-term debt-to-sales ratio and finds that this term is
fully significant only for financially constrained firms. This
confirms the liquidity role of inventories when there are no
clear alternatives to liquidity provision like financial instru-
ments or simply because they are market imperfections.
Then, if a firm is listed on the stock market, financial
instruments providing liquidity are easier to access and
inventory accumulation will be less in demand to address
liquidity issues like short-term financial obligations. This
argument suggests a negative effect of an IPO in a firm’s
inventory accumulation. On the opposite side, firmsmay use
financial assets—debt, equity, and different hybrid instru-
ments—to finance its investment decisions like inventory
accumulation. Calomiris et al. (1994) argued that firms may
use commercial paper as a way to finance inventory
investments during downturns. Also, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993) found that large firms (with access to financial
markets) show substantial increases in inventories as well
as short-term debt around cyclical peaks. This suggests that
financial instruments may be used to finance real assets like
inventories along the whole economic cycle. Summarizing,
liquidity issues do not lead to a clear-cut conclusion on the
effect of an IPO on inventory accumulation.
Concerning inventory variability, the existence of these
different financing alternatives through financial markets
4
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Production12Moreover, the underwriter of the IPO will stimulate this behavior
in order to maintain its reputation.
fi
bakes inventory policy less dependent on liquidity
hocks, reducing inventory variability. Along this line
ashyap et al. (1994) empirically showed and Hendel
1996) developed a theory predicting that inventories are
ore sensitive to liquidity shocks when a firm is credit
onstrained (i.e., it has a limited access to financial
struments). In conclusion, liquidity-financing issues
uggest that the easy access to financing instruments
fter an IPO should be translated in a decrease in the
ventory variability. Then, when we join signaling and
quidity arguments, we can state:
ypothesis 1. Firms after an IPO, decrease their inventory
vel as well as their inventory variability.
Furthermore, we distinguish two important types of
ventories, namely raw-goods inventories and final-
oods inventories. Raw-material inventories are more
quid inventories because they are less specific and can
e easily cashed on input factor markets. This means that
fter an IPO, the liquidity needs of a firm, which are
ainly satisfied through financing issues, will put less
ressure on inventory accumulation, particularly on those
hat are more cashable (raw-material inventories). Then,
e expect a steeper reduction in such a type of inventories
fter an IPO in comparison with final-good ones. Addi-
ionally, by focusing on signaling issues, a substantial
ccumulation of raw-good inventories is a more powerful
ignal that a firm is going to compete fiercely in the
edium to long term. Then, the signaling role that share
rices will play after an IPO will reduce the need to use
ventories for signaling purposes whose role, as afore-
entioned, is more important in raw-material inven-
ories. Hence, a steeper disinvestment in raw-material
ventories is expected in comparison with final-good
ventories. Consistent with this, Chen et al. (2005), who
nalyzed the components of the overall inventory invest-
ent for the US between 1981 and 2000, showed that raw
aterials declined about 3% per year, whereas finished-
oods inventories did not decline at all. This is our second
ypothesis to test:
ypothesis 2. Inventory reductions after an IPO will be
rger for raw-material inventories than for final-goods
ventories.
Drawing from the previous arguments, we also expect a
tronger effect on inventories after an IPO for those firms
hat have larger liquidity and/or signaling needs previous
o the IPO. In this line, Kashyap et al. (1994), Hendel
1996), and Carpenter et al. (1994) showed that the
ventory policy of firms with financing difficulties, like
redit-constrained companies, are more sensitive to
quidity shocks. Then, an IPO as a positive liquidity shock
hould have more pronounced operational effects on
hese types of firms.5 Also, small firms, especially if they
5 Also there is an informational argument that supports this
mics 118 (2009) 10–18rm has to maintain short-term liquidity assets like inventories, or risk
eing punished by investors. In this sense, inventories in the period
is our last hypothesis.
share issues compared with debt ones.
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estimations. However, for the sake of clarity, in Table 1 we have shown
n Econare growing, bear large information asymmetries (adverse
selection problems). Consequently, these firms are parti-
cularly eager to signal themselves as fierce competitors.
They would use mechanisms such as inventory accumula-
tion as signals if there are no signaling alternatives. These
alternatives appear after an IPO in the form of more
efficient mechanisms, like market prices, and inventories
lose part of their informational content. Thus, we expect a
steep decrease in the inventory level. Furthermore, in
terms of control, small firms are expected to have less
developed internal controlling mechanisms than larger
firms. This means that the beneficial improvement in
control due to the pressure from the financial markets,
that prevents inventory overinvestment, will be larger for
small firms in comparison with larger ones. This idea is
captured in our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Inventory reductions after an IPO will be
larger for small firms and firms with financing difficulties.
If we look at the effect of subsequent share issues
after an IPO, we expect three consequences. First, the
increase in a firm’s liquidity and in the reduction of
the cost of capital will be larger after an IPO in comparison
with posterior share issues.6 Second, the control will
not increase in these other issues because market
institutions were already present since the initial offering.
Third, the quality of the signal that a firm sends after the
initial issue is more powerful than those of subsequent
issues because the requirements that a firm has to satisfy
are relatively more demanding for a non-listed firm
previous to the first issue. These arguments suggest a
steeper inventory reduction after an IPO in comparison
with other share issues. This leads us to our fourth
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. Inventory reductions will be more pro-
nounced after an IPO than after subsequent share issues.
Apart from shares, firms may issue debt to raise capital
and they have substantial differences with equity issues
that justify a differential impact on inventories. First,
equity is a financial instrument with more length than
debt. This implies that there is a lower reduction in a
firm’s liquidity needs after a debt issue. Note that debt has
to be renewed with additional issues when expires. Then,
in order to prevent future liquidity needs, firms will be
less tempted to reduce inventories. Second, lenders
generally require some collateral as a counterpart for
their provision of capital. This is an intrinsic characteristic
of debt contracts, which may hinder inventory reduction
as they may be used as tangible collateral (Tribo´, 2001).
Last, shareholders, as opposed to debtholders, have junior
(footnote continued)
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Productioprevious to the IPO may have some visibility for external investors in
their valuation of the company in the absence of more informative
signals like stock prices. Once a financially constrained firm is listed,
investors rely on stock prices for the valuation of the company and
inventories are less informative.
6 In a different context, Casasola and Tribo´ (2004) showed that the
reduction in the cost of capital is larger after an initial debt issue than
after the posterior issues.rights over the cash generated by a project; this is
inversely related to the inventories accumulated. Hence
shareholders will have more incentives to monitor
managers than debtholders and, consequently, avoid the
reduction in residual cash as a consequence of misman-
agement due to inventory overinvestment. Then, if
inventory accumulation is the outcome of a firm’s
mismanagement, we expect a superior inventory reduc-
tion after an equity issue rather than after a debt one. This
omics 118 (2009) 10–18 13Hypothesis 5. Inventory reductions will be larger for3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data and preliminary evidence
We carried out our empirical analysis making use of a
sample of US firms extracted from COMPUSTAT database
for the period 1994–2004. The initial sample had 9079
firms, but we only considered companies for which we
had available information of their IPO date. The final
sample was an incomplete panel data of 3383 companies
that had IPO dates between 1994 and 2004.
To characterize a firm’s inventory level, we used
the inventory-to-sales ratio on a log scale (Inventory_
to_Sales).7 For the inventory variability we took the
standard deviation of the inventory stock year-by-year
(SD_Inventory).
Regarding our financing issues variables, we used the
following proxies.:
IPO is a dummy variable that was equal to 1 if the year
of the observation was posterior to the IPO date and zero
otherwise. Equity_Issues is a dummy that was equal to 1 if
the equity issued in posterior periods after the IPO had a
value larger than then mean value for the sample and zero
otherwise. Debt_Issues is a dummy that was equal to 1 if
the debt issued by the firm had a value larger than the
sample mean value, and zero otherwise.8
We approached a firm’s financial strength (Financial_
Strength) with the Z-score measure of Bankruptcy
(COMPUSTAT mnemonic ZSCORE).9 Financial_Strength
assumed values of 0, 1, and 2 if the ZSCORE had values
lower than 1.8, between 1.8 and 3, and larger than 3,
respectively. This corresponds to a high, medium, and low
probability of bankruptcy.
The firm size (Size) is the number of employees on a
log scale.
7 The use of a log scale reduces problems of heteroskedasticity in thethe ratio of inventory-to-sales without transforming on a log scale.
8 The average value of debt and equity issues is a natural benchmark
to compare for characterizing those issues that were significant enough.
9 This concept is a bankruptcy prediction model developed by
Altman (1997). If a value less than 1.81 is returned, than there is a high
probability of bankruptcy. If a value greater than 3.0 is returned, than
there is a low probability of bankruptcy. This item was designed to
forecast failure in the short term (up to 2 years).
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Table 1
Contingency analysis
Panel A
Inventory-to-sales Inventory-to-sales
(raw materials)
Inventory-to-sales
(finished goods)
SD-inventory
IPO ¼ 0 23.10% 10.10% 5.31% 2.544
IPO ¼ 1 18.49% 8.30% 5.47% 0.920
T-testa 1.61 (0.106) 11.43 (0.000) 0.93 (0.350) 11.452 (0.000)
Equity_Issues ¼ 0 16.40% 5.57% 5.26% 0.763
Equity_Issues ¼ 1 21.50% 10.64% 5.55% 1.201
T-testa 2.23 (0.025) 1.56 (0.118) 0.99 (0.320) 1.56 (0.118)
Debt_Issues ¼ 0 20.00% 9.46% 5.69% 1.034
Debt_Issues ¼ 1 14.71% 2.65% 3.64% 0.726
T-testa 1.40 (0.161) 1.27 (0.203) 1.06 (0.290) 1.27 (0.204)
Panel B
Inventory-to-sales
Small ¼ 1a
Inventory-to-sales
Small ¼ 0a
Inventory-to-sales
Financial_Strength ¼ 0a
Inventory-to-sales
Financial_Strength ¼ 1a
IPO ¼ 0 26.22% 19.56% 35.27% 17.95%
IPO ¼ 1 20.24% 12.59% 20.93% 18.16%
T-testb 1.52 (0.128) 2.04 (0.042) 1.47 (0.140) 0.37 (0.710)
Equity_Issues ¼ 0 17.32% 13.45% 15.09% 16.75%
Equity_Issues ¼ 1 24.04% 15.53% 29.79% 19.12%
T-testb 2.22 (0.026) 0.73 (0.465) 1.98 (0.047) 1.51 (0.131)
Debt_Issues ¼ 0 21.68% 14.92% 24.87% 18.37%
Debt_Issues ¼ 1 15.17% 14.11% 14.56% 16.16%
T-testb 1.32 (0.186) 0.08 (0.938) 0.81 (0.413) 0.89 (0.372)
Test of variables that capture variations in the inventory policy contingent on those events that involve debt or equity issues. See the empirical analysis
section for the definition of the different variables.
a Small firms means that the variable of employment is lower than the mean value for all the sample (4). Financial_Strength ¼ 1 (0) means that the Z-
score measure of Bankruptcy variable (COMPUSTAT mnemonic ZSCORE) has a value larger than 3 (lower than 1.8).
b Test of mean values. P-values are in parentheses.
inventories show a variation whose magnitude is larger than that of
finished-good inventories but lower than that of raw-material ones.
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Production Economics 118 (2009) 10–1814To contrast Hypothesis 3, we crossed Financial_
Strength and Size with our IPO variable (IPO_Size and
IPO_Financial_Strength).
As controls, we introduced a variable of financial
structure (Debt_Equity), which was computed as the
debt-to-equity ratio. This variable, together with the
Financial_Strength measure, are proxies for the firm’s
liquidity needs. Also, the firm’s growth perspectives
were approached through the firm’s R&D investment
(R&D). The inclusion of these two variables in the
specification was intended to avoid spurious correlations
between financial issues measures and those that
capture inventory investments. Liquidity needs and
growth perspectives may explain both variables, as we
have argued in the theoretical part, due to technological
shocks. Hence, it was important to control for these
two features. Finally, we introduced temporal and sectoral
dummy variables.
To provide preliminary evidence of our theoretical
contentions, we conducted different tests of mean
differences that are displayed in Table 1.
Table 1 shows the variation in inventory level and
inventory variability once we compare the periods before
and after different significant events: an IPO (row 1),
a significant equity issue (row 2), and a significant
debt issue (row 3). We found a significant lower
inventory-to-sales level in those periods after an IPO.he percentage decreases from 23.10% to 18.49%. This
onforms to Hypothesis 1. Also, we have found that the
eduction after an IPO is more pronounced in raw-
aterial inventories rather than for finished-good
ventories (columns 2 and 3 of panel A).10 This
onformed to Hypothesis 2. Concerning the comparison
etween small and large firms as well as between firms
ith strong and weak financial strength (panel B),
e found that after an IPO, the reduction in inventories
as significantly larger in financially constrained firms
Financial_Strength ¼ 0) than for their counterparts.
owever, we did not detect major differences in terms
f the size of firms. This partially conforms to Hypothesis
. Finally, we did not find evidence of the larger decrease
the inventory level after an equity issue rather than
fter a debt one.In this section, we contrast our theoretical contentions
elying on regression techniques and taking advantage of
he panel data structure of our sample. Our basic
10 In an unreported estimation, we have found that work-in-progress
4. Conclusions
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n Econspecification is as follows:
Inventory_to_Salesit
¼ bþ b1IPOit þ b2Equity_Issuesit
þ b3 Debt_Issuesit þ b4 IPO_Sizeit
þ b5 IPO_Financial_Strengthit þ b6 Sizeit
þ b7 Financial_Strengthit þ b8 Debt_Equityit
þ b9 R&Dit þ ui þ ct þ it (1)
where ui accounts for the unobservable heterogeneity, ct
is a temporal error term, and eit is a white-noise error
term.
We recognize the possibility that ui may be correlated
with changes in a firm’s ownership structure due to equity
or debt issues (fixed effects). For example, an intrinsic
characteristic of the firm, like the degree of managerial
risk aversion, has a clear impact on the probability of an
IPO as well as on the type of investment policy that will
affect inventory levels. This means that ui is correlated to
the IPO variables as well as IPO_Size and IPO_Financial_
Strength. A second endogeneity problem appears when
some independent variables may be correlated with the
non-firm specific component of the error term eit. It may
be the case that an improvement in a firm’s technology
also increases the efficiency of inventory management
(reducing the inventory-to-sales ratio).11 At the same
time, it may trigger a firm’s IPO because of the need of
further capital provision to develop this new technology.
In this case, the correlation between the IPO variable and
the inventory-to-sales would be spurious. In order to
eliminate both endogeneity problems, we have conducted
a GMM estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991), where we
have taken as instruments of the potential endogenous
variables (Equity_Issues and Debt Issues and IPO) the
different temporal lags of these variables. However, for the
variables IPO, it does not make sense to take temporal lags
as instruments, and we have used instead the mean value
of these variables for the corresponding sector and year.12
The literature reports that IPOs come in waves (Ritter and
Welch, 2002) and have a clear sectoral and temporal
component. This means that the mean value of the
variable IPO will be clearly correlated with IPO. However,
these mean values will be uncorrelated with the specific
shocks that affect a firm’s inventory policy. This makes the
variable a good candidate as an instrument.13
Table 2 shows four estimations. In column 1 the
dependent variable is Inventory_to_Sales. In columns 2
and 3, the dependent variable is the inventory-to-sales
ratio for raw materials and for finished goods, respec-
tively. Finally, in order to test more long-term effect, in
column 4 we lead Inventory_to_Sales by one period.
11 This kind of shock may explain the great moderation phenomenon
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Productioof a steady decrease in the output and inventory volatility in the US
(Blanchard and Simon (2000); Irvine and Schuh (2004); McConell and
Perez-Quiros (2000).
12 For the variables IPO_Size and IPO_Financial_Strength, we have
used as an instrument the product of the instrument of IPO times the
variables Size and Financial_Strength, respectively.
13 In all the models of Tables 2 and 3 the null hypothesis of
instruments validity is satisfied (Hansen test). Also, there is no second-
order serial correlation in the residuals (AR(2) test).The results of Table 2 confirm that after an IPO, the
inventory-to-sales ratio of a firm is lower than in those
periods previous to the IPO.14 Remarkably, this is also true
for more than one period after the IPO. This fully confirms
Hypothesis 1. Once we compare columns 2 and 3, we find
that the effect of being listed is more significant for raw-
material inventories than for finished-good ones. This is in
line with Hypothesis 2. Once we focus on the signs of
variables IPO_Size and IPO_Financial_Strength, we find
that only the latter is significant and positive. This
indicates that for firms with financial difficulties, there
is a larger reduction in the inventory-to-sales ratio after
the IPO. Hence, the liquidity provisions that these firms
receive once they are listed on financial markets have
superior effects in their inventory policy than their
counterparts. However, this differential effect is not
appreciable in terms of the Size variable. That is, there is
no further reduction in inventory-to-sales ratio after an
IPO for small firms when compared with large ones. We
can argue that financial constraints affect both small and
large firms that decide to go public, in the same way. This
confirms Hypothesis 3 partially.
The contrast between Hypothesis 4 and 5 is made by
comparing the coefficients of Equity_Issue and Debt-Issue
with that of IPO. We find that the IPO coefficient is more
negative than that of Equity_Issues. At the same time, the
Equity_Issues coefficient is more negative than that of
Debt_Issues (which is non-significant). Consistent with
Hypotheses 4 and 5, the most significant reductions in
inventory-to-sales ratio occur after an IPO, then after a
subsequent equity issue and finally after a debt issue.
Concerning control variables, we find that small firms
and, marginally, firms with financial difficulties accumu-
late relatively more inventories. Finally, to investigate the
effect of changes in the ownership structure on inventory
variability, we estimate the same specification as (1) but
using SD_Inventory as a dependent variable. The results
are shown in Table 3 and confirm that there is a reduction
not only in the inventory-to-sales ratio after an IPO, but
also in the inventory variability. Moreover, this reduction
is particularly important for those firms with financial
difficulties (positive sign of IPO_Financial_Strength). Re-
markably, these type of firms as well as small ones show,
in general, larger inventory variability, which is consistent
with Hendel’s (1996) findings and those by Carpenter
et al. (1994), who showed that standard deviation of
inventory investment is 50% larger for small than for
large firms. Finally, the last column of Table 3 reveals
that this effect also holds for more than one period after
the IPO.
omics 118 (2009) 10–18 15This paper shows the influence that being listed in the
stock market has on a firm’s inventory policy. After an IPO,
14 Note that in the system GMM approach, estimations are made indifferences. This means that the coefficient of IPO captures the marginal
impact on the inventory level once a particular firm changes its regime
from non-listed to listed.
firms accumulate fewer inventories and reduce their equity issue than for debt issue. These results may be
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Table 2
Estimations on Inventory_to_Salesa
Dependent variables Invent-to-sales Invent-to-sales (raw material) Invent-to-sales (final goods) Invent-to-sales (+1)
IPO 0.480*** 0.450*** 0.330 0.558***
(0.001) (0.024) (0.363) (0.000)
Debt_Issues 0.045 0.175 0.248 0.232**
(0.711) (0.212) (0.144) (0.069)
Equity_Issues 0.160** 0.211*** 0.324*** 0.171**
(0.028) (0.023) (0.002) (0.033)
IPO_Size 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.000
(0.883) (0.319) (0.660) (0.979)
IPO_Financial_Strength 0.155* 0.078 0.025 0.216**
(0.107) (0.554) (0.919) (0.030)
Size 0.004*** 0.010** 0.006 0.003***
(0.001) (0.032) (0.334) (0.003)
Financial_Strength 0.148* 0.184 0.092 0.155*
(0.104) (0.132) (0.679) (0.089)
Debt_Equity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.881) (0.972) (0.576) (0.841)
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(0.438) (0.777) (0.001) (0.414)
Constant 2.158*** 2.376*** 2.802*** 1.976***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 13038 7992 8129 11465
Fitness of the model 156.69 (0.000) 36.50 (0.000) 4.96 (0.000) 148.69 (0.000)
Hansen test (J statistic) 298.43 (0.339) 258.30 (0.895) 175.87 (1.000) 226.00 (1.000)
AR(2) test 1.11 (0.267) 0.27 (0.786) 1.22 (0.222) 1.40 (0.162)
All variables are defined in the empirical section. In column 1, the dependent variable is Inventory_to_Sales, in column 2 it is the raw-material inventory-
to-sales, while in column 3 it is the final-good inventory-to-sales. Finally, in column 4, the dependent variable is Inventory_to_Sales led by one period.
a P-values in parentheses. All specifications include sector and temporal dummy variables *90% significant, **95% significant, ***99% significant. F-test
used as fitness test. All are GMM estimations, where we have taken as instruments of the potential endogenous variables, Debt-Issues and Equity_issues
the different temporal lags of these variables. For the variable IPO, we have used the mean value of this variable for the corresponding sector and year. For
the crossed variables IPO_Size and IPO_Financial_Strength, we have used as an instrument the product of the instrument of IPO times the variables Size,
and Financial_Strength, respectively. The J statistic (P-values reported in parentheses) is distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis of
instruments validity. The AR(2) is a test for a second-order serial correlation in the residuals which is distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no
serial correlation.
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Production Economics 118 (2009) 10–1816inventory variability not only in the following period,
but more than one period ahead. Moreover, we distinguish
between raw-material inventories and final-good ones
and find that the reduction in inventories after an IPO is
more pronounced for the former. Regarding the type of
firms, inventory reduction is particularly evident for firms
with financial difficulties. We interpret this as evidence
suggesting that for these types of firms, the capital raised
through the stock market is particularly important and
makes inventory accumulation a less relevant tool for
sending informative signals on future prospects and
marginally so for preventing liquidity shocks.
A second type of results compares the inventory policy
when a firm issues debt instead of equity. Notably, the
reducing effects on the inventory levels are larger for thexplained by the superior provision of current and future
quidity and the larger control of managers that is
chieved after an equity issue. Generally, shareholders
ave larger monitoring incentives to prevent managerial
isbehaviour and inventory accumulation because, un-
ke debtholders, they have junior rights over the cash
enerated by projects.
We show the above results making use of a database of
S manufacturing firms for the period 1994–2004.
emarkably, our results describe a natural stabilizing
echanism that may smooth the economic cycle. In the
xpansive periods, a significant proportion of firms are
sted on the stock market which, according to our results,
hould generate a decrease in the inventory investment
nd in the last stage in the production. Conversely, in
recessive periods, there are a limited number of firms that
are sold in financial markets (Ritter andWelch, 2002). This
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 3
Estimations of variation on inventoriesa
Dependent variables SD_Inventory SD_Inventory SD_Inventory
(+1)
IPO 7.218*** 7.440*** 1.453**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.065)
Debt_Issues 0.665 1.782***
(0.288) (0.011)
Equity_Issues 0.357 0.752**
(0.389) (0.051)
IPO_Size 0.037 0.041** 0.012
(0.166) (0.060) (0.345)
IPO_Financial_Strength 2.470** 2.898** 0.526
(0.074) (0.032) (0.320)
Size 0.048** 0.049 0.015
(0.067) (0.122) (0.197)
Financial_Strength 2.404* 2.841** 0.594
(0.075) (0.032) (0.221)
Debt_Equity 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.925) (0.917) (0.894)
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.972) (0.921) (0.793)
Constant 12.606*** 12.334*** 4.329***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of
observations
9683 9683 8998
Fitness of the model 6.05 (0.000) 5.52 (0.000) 4.95 (0.000)
Hansen test 170.23 (1.000) 223.42 (0.727) 210.80 (0.144)
AR(2) test 0.44 (0.659) 0.31 (0.759) 0.65 (0.513)
All variables are defined in the empirical section. In columns 1, 2 and 3,
SD_Inventory (inventory variability) is the dependent variable. In
column 4 SD_Inventory is led by one period in order to analyze
persistence.
a P-values in parentheses. All specifications include sector and
temporal dummy variables. *90% significant, **95% significant, ***99%
significant. F-test used as fitness test. All are GMM estimations, where
we have taken as instruments of the potential endogenous variables,
Debt-Issues and Equity_Issues the different temporal lags of these
variables. For the variable IPO, we have used the mean value of this
variable for the corresponding sector and year. For the crossed variables
IPO_Size and IPO_Financial_Strength, we have used as an instrument the
product of the instrument of IPO times the variables Size, and
Financial_Strength, respectively. The J statistic (P-values reported in
parentheses) is distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis of
instruments validity. The AR(2) is a test for a second-order serial
correlation in the residuals which is distributed as N(0,1) under the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation.
J.A. Tribo´ / Int. J. Production Econeliminates one of the factors that may generate significant
disinvestments which, in turn, may deepen the aggregate
contraction in production. Taking a global perspective,
along all the economic cycle, the effect described reduces
the overinvestment during expansion periods and theunderinvestment in recessions. We think the effect that
we have described may be relevant, given that that in the
US, the proportion of IPOs as a percentage of the overall
market value has increased from less than 3% in 1990, to a
peak of 13% in 2000, before the burst of the bubble. After
that, the level stabilized around 7% (Rousseau, 2006). This
means that the relative weight of the new firms in the
overall economy has increased steadily and that the
inventory policies followed by these firms may be a
relevant variable to consider in explaining fluctuations in
the economic cycle. The investigation of this issue in
greater depth is an avenue for future research.
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